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THE POST-NEOLIBERAL SOUTH AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
EL DESARROLLO POST-NEOLIBERAL DE AMÉRICA DEL SUR
ABSTRACT
RESUMEN
This study addressed the triangular relations between Latin America, Beijing and Washington 
in the last 15 years using a process tracing technique on the economic and political models of 
the region. It specifically focused on the South American development during the post-Washin-
gton Consensus era, as well as the expanding influence of China over this region. The aim of 
this paper was to transmit the idea that the failure of neoliberalism in the 90s together with the 
expansionism of China have shaped the contemporary political and economic arena among the 
countries of South America. This work could help to understand the historical process of the 
construction of develop paradigms on the region and its impact on the society.
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Este estudio analizó las relaciones triangulares entre América Latina, Pekín y Washington en 
los últimos 15 años por medio de un rastreo del proceso político y económico de los estados 
de la región. Se centró específicamente en el desarrollo de América del Sur durante la era 
post-neoliberal, y la creciente influencia de China sobre esta región. El objetivo de este trabajo 
fue promulgar la idea de que los medios por los cuales se ha formado la arena política y eco-
nómica contemporánea de los países latinoamericanos han sido, el fracaso de las doctrinas del 
Consenso de Washington en los años noventa en conjunto el expansionismo chino. El aporte 
del presente trabajo va dirigido a la comprensión del proceso histórico de la construcción de 
paradigmas de desarrollo en la región y su impacto en la sociedad.
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INTRODUCTION
The new millennium embodied a breakpoint 
in Latin American politics. After 20 years of 
adjustment, which was the subtle term used 
for referring to the neoliberal guidelines 
imposed by international financial institu-
tions (Williamson 1990:7), a wave of leftist 
leaders that promoted anti-neoliberal ideo-
logies gained popularity among the public. 
The socialist trend started in 1998 with the 
triumph of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, fo-
llowed by the victory of the Workers Party in 
Brazil led by Ignacio Lula da Silva in 2002. 
Then, a series of populist left-wing leaders 
gained power as in the case of Rafael Correa 
in Ecuador in 2007, Evo Morales in Bolivia 
in 2006 and the former guerrilla man Jose 
Mújica in Uruguay in 2010. 
Some of this left-winged leader have alig-
ned with the ideas of the ‘21st Century So-
cialism’, promulgated by Heinz Dieterich in 
1996 and then restructured at the Sao Paulo 
forum by the socialist South American lea-
ders. Rafael Correa (2014) set that it is not 
considered a model, but a series of princi-
ples that allows sovereign governments to 
generate economic and political models that 
are suitable for their own domestic reality. 
The four main principles of this doctrine are:
•   Prevalence of human capital over finan-
cial capital
•   Major use of direct democracy
•   Special protection for minority groups
• Self-determination and nationalization 
(Dieterich 2003:121-129)
Such series of principles have shaped the 
economic and political models in some sta-
tes, for instance El Buen Vivir in Ecuador, 
a model that provides constitutional rights 
to the Earth and the environment, as well as 
the Bolivariano model of Venezuela shaped 
by Hugo Chavez, and the Sumac Kumaña in 
Bolivia. Such models were aimed to convert 
Latin America into a region integrated under 
socialist patterns.
 In general terms, during the first decade 
of this millennium, those projects have de-
monstrated a positive progress in economic 
terms. The GDP of the region has grown 
around 4.5% each year and the unemploy-
ment rates have fallen from 11.2% in 2002 to 
6.4% in 2011. Furthermore, Latin America 
has lifted more than 64 million people from 
poverty and 60 million from the absolute po-
verty line; and, except for Venezuela, the re-
gion has maintained constantly low inflation 
levels (Cepal 2015). Some authors such as 
Do Alto (2008), Svampa (2008) and Paniz-
za (2009) have suggested that the autonomy 
in the Post-Washington Consensus policies 
have been the key factor that led to South 
American states to achieve such political and 
economic stability. However, there are fur-
ther aspects such as Chinese expansionism 
that has evidently influenced the progress of 
the region during the last 15 years.
The South American governments have en-
joyed an economic bonanza in the last deca-
de, primarily produced by two factors. First, 
a boom of the commodities market cau-
sed by Chinese demand for raw materials; 
and second, the increment of capital flows 
towards the region, from countries like Sou-
th Korea, Canada, Australia, and expressly 
from China. Therefore, it is conceivable that 
the stability of the mentioned leftist gover-
nments along with the success of their po-
licies may perhaps be associated in a direct 
way with the expanding influence from the 
Asian power over the region. Authors as 
Manriquez & Alvarez (2014), Wu & De Wei 
(2014) and Philips (2011), have paid special 
attention to the increasing expansion of Chi-
nese influence over South America. 
 Nowadays, China is the leading world expor-
ter and the 2nd major economy in the world 
(Francoise 2013:25-26). In terms of bilateral 
trading with Latin America, the commerce 
figures climbed sharply during the first deca-
de of the millennium; the Sino–Latin Ame-
rican trade skyrocketed from US$10 billion 
in 2000 to a pre-crisis peak of over US$143 
billion in 2008. China became either the first 
or second largest trading partner for most 
Latin American countries. Meanwhile, La-
tin America has become China’s fifth-largest 
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METHODOLOGY
This scientific paper is the result of a research 
that aimed to investigate the connexion that 
exist between the failures of the Neoliberal 
guidelines in the South American countries 
during the 90s and the Chinese expansio-
nism over the world. The connexion will be 
reflected on the change of the development 
paradigms that has shaped the contemporary 
political-economy arena of the region.  At 
the end of this work paper, the reader will 
acquire an understanding about the way in 
which the upsurge of the Chinese power has 
influenced the policy-making of the South 
American states over the last 15 years. The 
argument will be developed over 3 parts. 
The first one will be dedicated to discus-
sing about the on-going power shifts in the 
international-political arena. This part will 
include a narrative about the failure of the 
Washington Consensus guidelines, as well 
as a clarification about the details of the 
contemporary power struggle between the 
main contemporary hegemonic powers, in 
order to recuperate this data, the study used 
a documentation of primary and secondary 
sources.   The aim of this section is to set the 
actual scenery of the interrelations between 
Beijing, Washington and South America. 
The second part aims to define the connec-
tion between the Chinese expansion and the 
rise of leftist governments in South Ameri-
ca. This section will include a study about 
the uprising of the left over the region, par-
ticularly after the failure of the Washington 
Consensus. It also will include an illustra-
tion of the macroeconomic indicators of the 
performance of the region over the last 15 
years, with the intention of evaluating whe-
ther the domestic policies created in some 
countries of South America after the Was-
hington Consensus have created real deve-
lopment in the region or if it was merely a 
fictitious growth. 
trading partner (León-Manriquez & Hearn 
2011:11-12). 
As well, for some South American adminis-
trations, including the ones in Ecuador, Ve-
nezuela and the Argentinean before Macri, 
the Chinese government has turned into the 
new alternative for financial assistance, in 
some way setting aside the influence of the 
traditional international financial institutions 
as the International Monetary Found (IMF). 
Agreeing to Chinese borrowing terms do not 
include any type of policy reforms or fiscal 
adjustment. 
Instead, the Asian state mostly requires the 
recognition of the One-China policy and the 
signing of long-term commercial contracts, 
headed to supply China a daily fixed quan-
tity of commodities; in most of the cases, 
oil, minerals and natural gas (Wu & De Wei 
2014:790). In this way, China does not only 
ensure a long-term supply of commodities, 
but also gains recognition of its national line 
of thought. In the same manner, South Ame-
rican governments, benefit from market di-
versification, as well as financial assistance 
without any requirements of policy adjust-
ment. 
The expanding influence of China over de-
veloping regions has brought debates about 
the geopolitical implications of China’s rise. 
One standpoint perceives China as a threat 
to the United States’ position as the sole su-
perpower. This challenge to US hegemony 
could be a cause of instability and poten-
tial conflict in the future. However, further 
views have emphasised the peaceful rise of 
China, and the benefits of its expansionism. 
One example of it was mentioned before: It 
is how the commodity boom over the last 15 
years, along with the financial aid and spe-
cialised investment made by China has brou-
ght an economic expansion for developing 
economies, particularly to South America. 
In this way, the Chinese economy could be 
complementary to those of other developing 
countries that stand to gain from China’s 
growth (Rhys 2010:810-812).  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: 
The Decalogue for Development
Finally, the third section will provide 3 par-
ticular case study using a process tracing 
technique, in which by analysing the neoli-
beral guidelines that led Argentina, Bolivia 
and Ecuador to a financial or an economic 
crisis, along with a study about expansion in 
economic and diplomatic bilateral relations 
with China, I aim to offer a narrowed and ac-
curate perspective of the way in which these 
factors have been an essential foundation for 
the construction of the current economic and 
public policies of those countries, as well as 
the real impacts these policies have had du-
ring this period of time.
During the 60s and the 70s, Latin American 
states acquired substantial sums of foreign 
debt, particularly with the IMF for adjusting 
the disproportion on its balance of payments. 
Such imbalances were mainly caused by the 
inefficiency of import substitution policies 
that those states maintained after World War 
II. 
An example of such practices was using fo-
reign loans to protect the state enterprises, 
compensating its inefficacy and making them 
able to compete at domestic level. In this 
way, the South American states were using 
the financial loans provided by the IMF not 
only to correct macroeconomic imbalances, 
but also to finance the public industry defi-
cit. By 1980, most Latin America economies 
became immersed in economic stagflation, 
mainly triggered by the collapse of the raw 
materials markets and the US Dollar appre-
ciation (Rangel & Soto Reyes 2012:42). 
In 1982 the Mexican state, which was unable 
to borrow, ran out of financial reserves and 
this situation ultimately led to default on its 
foreign debt. The Mexican default triggered 
a series of complications for all Latin Ameri-
can states. The US authorities alleged that to 
avoid a contagious inflation, it was necessary 
to restrict the quantity of money circulating 
in the economy. Thus, the North-American 
state increased their interest rates producing 
a rise in the price of their currency. The La-
tin American states, which were indebted in 
US Dollars, attained a foreign debt capable 
to reach record levels. Consequently, much 
of states in the region fell into a situation that 
made them unable repay their foreign debt.
To avoid a massive default, the internatio-
nal institutional creditors came into the res-
cue. However, they also viewed a perfect 
opportunity to extend the neoliberal system 
to South America (Rangel & Soto Reyes 
2012:40-45). After the failure of the Cepa-
list model of import substitution, the Latin 
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American states were required an open, sta-
ble and liberalized economic model. 
At least this was the prescription that neo-
liberal economists of the time suggested, 
including Williamson (1990) and Richard 
(1990). This is how the neoliberal guidelines 
were crystallized with the formulation of the 
Washington Consensus. A Decalogue of po-
licy reforms which fundamentally proposed 
that economic reforms should be based on 
the logic of the markets, besides from being 
characterized by openness and macroecono-
mic principles. The Washington Consensus 
could, therefore, be summarized by ten main 
guidelines:
• Fiscal Discipline 
• Redirection of public expenditure towards 
education, healthcare and infrastructure
• Tax reforms to extend the tax base
• Interest rate liberalization
• A competitive exchange rates
• Trade liberalization
• Liberalization of foreign investment in-
flows
• Privatization
• Deregulation to commerce
• Property Rights (Williamson 1990)
The effects of the Washington Consensus 
over Latin America raised, and still raises, 
several arguments concerned with debates 
about the triumph or failure of liberalism 
and the way in which globalization is percei-
ved. However, it is undeniable that the libe-
ral guidelines were unsatisfactory for Latin 
America since they did not accomplish their 
main objective.  
As a matter of fact, after a decade of its im-
plementation, states such as Argentina, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela 
and Uruguay were hit by a series of econo-
mic, financial and political issues that could 
most certainly be linked to the unsatisfactory 
reaction of the public towards the neolibe-
ral policies implemented during the 90s. In 
addition, the implementation and the main-
tenance of the neoliberal policies caused the 
South American countries to acquire an even 
larger amount of foreign debt. 
Such a situation produced a vicious cycle, in 
which the states needed money to maintain 
the neoliberal policies, but then again, the 
International Financial Institutions only pro-
vided them conditionally loans, upon the im-
plementation of further neoliberal policies. 
Such a situation made it impossible for the 
South American states to redirect the money 
of their loans to matters that would enhance 
their development like education, infrastruc-
ture and technology. Instead it was used to 
pay the cost of policy implementations, and 
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the repayment of their debts with higher in-
terest rates. Consequently, these states were 
not able to industrialize their production and 
were condemned to be indebted raw material 
exporters (Rangel & Soto Reyes 2012:46-
57). 
The Chinese expansion and the US hege-
monic decline
While Latin America entered a decade of 
economic stagnation in the 80s, China on 
the other hand was starting a period of rapid 
economic growth. Since the 80s, the Chine-
se economy not only has grown at almost 
10 per cent per annum, which resulted in a 
sevenfold increase in the income per capi-
ta. But it has also become the second-largest 
economy in the world. Furthermore, its suc-
cessful reintegration to the global economy 
had situated the Asian power as the world’s 
largest exporter ahead of Germany and Ja-
pan. In addition, Chinese companies such as 
Sinopec and China National Petroleum have 
become key players in the commodities mar-
ket, particularly in the extraction and energy 
industries. Since 2000, the Asian power has 
been expanding its influence in the world 
beyond commerce. China started having a 
major impact on the political, financial and 
diplomatic affairs.
Manriquez & Alvarez (2014), demostrated 
how Latin America is still a highly econo-
mic-dependent region, and also they out-
lined the ideological, political and mostly 
economic fissures of the relations between 
United States and Latin America. They went 
on to explain how China is taking advan-
tage of this situation in order to gain more 
influence over the Latin Amercian region. 
Even though the general perspective of the 
US-Latin American relations shows a solid 
compromise, the reality is revealed when the 
studies are geographically separated. As it 
could be seen in table 2, the total trade be-
tween the two parties rose from US$ 339 
billion in 2000, to US$ 586 billion in 2012. 
In addition, Latin America has gained rele-
vance in US foreign trade figures. In 1990, 
the region accounted for 13.3% of US ex-
ports and 12.9% of US imports. By 2009, 
the respective shares increased to 22.1% and 
18.1% respectively (Cepal 2015). However, 
58% of US trade with Latin America took 
place with Mexico, and the commercial flow 
of the nineteen other states accounted for 
just US$ 340 billion. Furthermore, while the 
United States is still the major commercial 
partner of almost all the countries in Cen-
tral America and in the Caribbean, China 
has displaced the United States as the major 
commercial partner in many South American 
states (Manriquez & Alvarez 2014:8-14). 
There are several factors that are contribu-
ting to the capacity of China to overstep the 
United States’ economic and political in-
fluence in the region. For Manriquez & Al-
varez (2014:11-12) the list includes first, the 
geographical conditions, in which the Uni-
ted States is still able to influence states with 
geographical contiguity, but is inefficient 
to maintain its control over all the states in 
the region. Second, the US neglect for Latin 
America due to its focus on the Middle East. 
And third, a lack of trust in the orthodox 
neoliberal guidelines.
On the other hand, China has emerged in La-
tin America as the new financial alternative. 
China has disbursed since 2010, more than 
US$110 billion in high-level investment to 
Latin America and nowadays has become 
the 3rd highest investor in this region. Fur-
thermore, China has become a donor-mem-
ber for the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), providing China a seat on the 
Board of Governors, allowing China the ca-
pacity to influence decision-making in terms 
of financial policies and investment of the 
26 Latin American countries part of the IDB 
(Wu & De Wei 2014).  
The financial power of China is becoming 
its most efficient weapon to expand its in-
fluence. Nowadays, China has accumulated 
US$3.4 trillion of official foreign exchan-
ge reserves. Furthermore, it is the second 
biggest creditor of the US foreign debt 
(US$1164 billons [7.5% of the total United 
States foreign debt]). Although the United 
States still maintains privileges due the po-
sition of the US dollar as the key currency of 
24
REVISTA CHAKIÑAN, 2018, Nº.5, AGOSTO, (18-39)
ISSN 2550-6722
the world, the massive accumulation of Chi-
nese financial assets has situated the United 
States in a very sensitive position, as the Chi-
nese expansion of financial influence over 
the United States is affecting its hegemonic 
political capabilities. Thus, the United States 
is watching carefully how China continues 
to expand its influence over the South Ame-
rican region, and considering how best to act 
to not affect its own financial stability. 
The former Australian Prime Minister, Ke-
vin Rudd (2015), now president of the Asia 
Society Policy Institute, declared that:
If China does become the world’s 
largest economy, it will be the 
first time in 200 years that in the 
world we will have as the largest 
economy a non-English speaking 
country, a non-Western country, 
and a non-liberal democratic coun-
try…It will affect so many things 
at so many levels. It will go to 
the absolute core. It’s happening 
quietly. It is happening persistent-
ly. It is happening in some senses 
under the radar’. (Rudd 2015:1)
Such description perfectly captures how 
China has expanded its influence over de-
veloping regions, particularly in North Afri-
ca and Latin America. Being a great power 
has never been solely about the possession 
of large amounts of crude material power. It 
has been closely related to notions of legiti-
macy and authority, in this way, the Chinese 
power has been combined with a long-term 
sense of where it would like to be and that, as 
a state, it must date maintained a significant 
degree of strength and coherence (Hurrell 
2006). Since 2001, the presence of China in 
South America has intensified, and this it is 
not a coincidence. 
The affiliation of China to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) changed commercial 
rules all over the globe. The leftist gover-
nments saw an opportunity to expand their 
markets to Southeast Asian states and parti-
cularly to China, which had already started 
to increase its commerce over the region du-
ring the late 90s. The commercial guidelines 
of all the South American states have started 
to include openness to Chinese markets as 
key goals in their foreign and commercial 
policies (Oliva 2010:113). 
Attempting to generate a different scheme 
of cooperation comprising the non-Western 
Southern regions of the globe, China has 
chosen a softer pattern of influence, which 
has given the impression to be solely concer-
ned with commercial matters at first glance, 
but later pursuing political and diplomatic 
acknowledgment. For instance, China has 
changed its policy and now can expand its 
commercial flow and direct its investment 
towards developing countries that still main-
tains good relations with Taiwan, such as 
Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay. This 
has been done deliberately with the aim of 
opening further diplomatic channels later 
down the line, such as happened in 2004 
and 2007, with the Dominican Republic and 
Costa Rica respectively, both Caribbean sta-
tes which have maintained a historical sche-
me of cooperation with Taiwan but switched 
rapidly their diplomatic recognition of the 
People’s Republic of China when they per-
ceived that doing so would be beneficial 
(Manriquez & Álvarez 2014:22) (Wu & De 
Wei 2014:795-797). 
China is also pursuing a recognition as a 
market economy state, regardless of its mer-
cantilist practices, which include an artificial 
depreciated currency exchange rate, dum-
ping, copyright infringements, various cases 
of child labour and extreme working condi-
tions. In South America, states as Argentina, 
Peru, Venezuela Brazil and Chile, without 
regard of the counter effects that such condi-
tions have on their own commercial sectors, 
have granted China the condition of a market 
economy state, since Chinese officials have 
imposed this condition to continue a com-
mercial and financial scheme of cooperation 
(Urdinez 2014). 
The Sino diplomacy and its influence for 
the upsurge of the leftist policies in the 
South
Wu & De Wei (2014:789-799), have recog-
nized two main areas of Chinese foreign po-
licy influence over Latin American states. 
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The first is concerned with finances and the 
economy. It includes oil negotiations, com-
mercial reliance, borrowing and investment. 
The second area is about diplomatic recog-
nition and political expansionism, including 
the global recognition of the ‘One China’ 
Policy. 
One of the bases of the success of the Chine-
se expansion in South America had been re-
lated to the platforms that China used since 
2000 for engaging with these nations in eco-
nomic affairs, leaving the pursuit of diplo-
matic recognition as a secondary priority. By 
doing so, China has been welcomed by the 
South American states as an option to diver-
sify its markets and for obtaining financial 
aid and investments. China has focused on 
creating solid relations based on economic 
and financial matters first and, after securing 
these, branching out into the diplomatic and 
ideological arena. It is evident that China has 
learned the lesson of the failure of the neo-
liberal scheme managed during the 80s and 
the 90s. (Wu & De Wei 2014:800)  
The leftist projects in Latin America de-
monstrated decent outcomes, which could 
be validated by both the popular acceptan-
ce of the leftist leaders during their admi-
nistrations as well as the good results given 
by macroeconomic indicators, which shown 
a consistent expansion on the GDP growth 
rates per year and a decrease in inflation and 
unemployment rates; in comparison to the 
numbers during the Washington Consensus 
reforms in the 90s. However, since 2014, the 
popularity of the leaders has started to decli-
ne, because of two important factors. First, 
criticism about the increasing levels of ac-
cumulation in both public and foreign debt, 
particularly with China. And second, the rec-
kless allocation of public funds, especially 
in the Andean region administrations, inclu-
ding Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina but, most 
expressly, Venezuela. 
Saul Quincy (2011) determined that these 
are common problems with socialist models, 
which denote the unsustainability of such 
projects for two reasons. Firstly, because 
leftist leaders have only focused on winning 
socialist goals, preventing any alternative 
for the model that they have proposed and 
therefore showing the populist and self-in-
terested characteristics of such models. And 
secondly, due to the lack of empathy of the 
professionals and middle classes towards the 
social policies, probably because they have 
been educated under neoliberal bases. In Ve-
nezuela for instance, the professional class is 
so ideologically capitalist that even doctors 
must be imported from Cuba to work in the 
public sector as, so few Venezuelan doctors 
are willing to treat the poor if their personal 
income is affected. (Quincy 2011)
The Argentinean Case
In Argentina, six of the ten neoliberal poli-
cies were applied for the economic restruc-
turing of the state including a fixed nominal 
exchange rate, trade liberalization, an inten-
sive privatization scheme, and deregulation 
of the labour conditions, allowing outsour-
cing and non-contractual ways of employ-
ment. Silva (2015), studied the reformation 
into two sub-periods. 
The first period of boom, started in 1991 and 
extended up until the third quarter of 1998 
and the second one of crisis, which begins 
in the fourth quarter of 1998 and lasts up to 
the end of 2001. It is true that during the first 
period the neoliberal policies had an accep-
table performance, not only by facilitating 
the expansion of the Argentinean markets, 
but also by pressuring companies to become 
more productive. 
However, the flipside of this process was the 
accumulation of financial and fiscal imba-
lances caused by the cost of implementing 
and maintaining these neoliberal policies, 
especially the cost of maintaining the pari-
ty of the Argentina Peso to the US Dollar. 
In addition, there was a deterioration in sta-
te power due to the austerity measures im-
posed, which was clearly expressed in the 
breakup of the alliances in parliament, and a 
general loss of legitimacy among their elec-
toral base, producing apart from the econo-
mic unproductivity, a profound political ins-
tability. 
The Argentinean crisis best known as the Co-
rralito was triggered in 2001 when the IMF 
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refused to release US$1.3 billion, alleging 
the failure of the Argentinean government to 
reach a previously agreed-upon budget de-
ficit target, while it also demanded further 
budget cuts. This episode not only caused a 
national demonization of the neoliberal ins-
titutions but also the spreading of a sense of 
discomfort to the whole population, espe-
cially to the most affected working classes. 
The situation led to a prolonged crisis, which 
ended in financial bankruptcy and a severe 
decline on real economy. Argentina ended in 
a situation where the bank accounts of the 
people were frozen for weeks, and 50% of 
the population officially became poor while 
another 25% was below the absolute line of 
poverty (Silva 2015). 
The Argentinian financial is one example 
of a vast range of events that demonstrated 
not only the unpopularity of the neoliberal 
policy among Latin Americans, but also the 
means in which the reckless implementation 
of these policies was never able to adjust to 
the South American reality, resulting in a 
fiasco that cost all the countries of the region 
various decades of unproductivity and large 
sums of financial obligations.
Although there is still a divergence of opi-
nions about the outcomes of the Washing-
ton Consensus in South America, a general 
perception among the authors, regardless of 
whether they are supporters or opponents of 
neoliberal dogmas and including the pers-
pectives of Cavallo (2004), Silva (2015) 
and Rangel & Soto Reyes (2012), is that 
the Washington Consensus left a sense of 
economic openness in Latin America and 
helped to rationalize the concept of globali-
zation for Latin Americans. Nevertheless, it 
also left an unpopular notion about neolibe-
ral institutions and the scheme in which they 
were regulated. 
The new-born Sino-Argentinean relations 
during the Kirchner administration were a 
good example to demonstrate the influence 
that Chinese diplomacy has over the econo-
mic and political decisions taken during this 
period. In 2003, after several interim presi-
dents, the left-wing leader, Nestor Kirchner 
became Argentinean president. The Kirch-
ner administration pursued an autonomous 
economic policy that was contrary to the 
guidelines imposed by the IMF in the 90s. 
The main objective of the Argentinean go-
vernment became the repayment of the debt, 
with the intention to disassociate the country 
from neoliberal prescriptions imposed by the 
multilaterals. Since its first day in the admi-
nistration, Kirchner implemented a series of 
social programs to reconsolidate the Argen-
tinean people’s trust in the government and 
such measures boosted his popularity among 
the public and provided political stability to 
Argentina (Panizza 2009:245). In 2006, Ar-
gentina achieved its national goal by paying 
its debt with a single payment of US$ 9.2 
billion (Navarro 2015). It could be said that 
somehow, the autonomous policies reco-
vered the Argentinean economy and made 
the state able to repay its debt obligations. 
However, there is an essential factor which 
facilitated the Argentinean recovery, and 
such factor indeed is China.
Since 2003 the strategic foreign policy goals 
of Argentina started to include guidelines 
which encouraged openness and enhance-
ment of diplomatic and commercial relations 
towards the Asiatic power. In fact, China 
was considered one of the seven great pivo-
tal points of Argentinean commercial policy 
which aimed to create permanent, balanced 
and mutual bilateral ties. In 2004, Kirchner 
visited Beijing and Shanghai accompanied 
by his ministers and his wife, Cristina Fer-
nandez, who in 2007 would be elected as 
President of Argentina. This was the first of 
many future encounters between Argenti-
nean and Chinese leaders. Because of such 
visits, a series of bilateral agreements were 
signed, mostly to promote mutual invest-
ment and to encourage the creation of Si-
no-Argentine companies. 
For China, the recognition as a market eco-
nomy by the government of Argentina was 
a key issue. However, the Argentinean sta-
te was applying 79 anti-dumping measures 
per year to Chinese products to protect its 
industry and workers. Nonetheless, China 
was offering a considerable increase in in-
vestment towards Argentina’s productive 
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sectors and infrastructure, besides it provi-
ded Argentina the status of tourist destina-
tion and, most important, accepted to provi-
de the financial aid that Argentina needed to 
fulfil its national prime objective, which was 
to pay back the debt. What’s more, Hu Jin-
tao had already gained the recognition from 
Brazilian’s president, Luiz Ignacio Lula da 
Silva, which would have conditioned the 
bargaining power of Argentinean officials 
who knew that granting China the condition 
of ‘market economy’ could produce dange-
rous effects on their national industry. Yet, 
before Jintao left South America, the nego-
tiations concluded with the signing of a ‘me-
morandum of mutual understanding’ which 
recognized China as a market economy state 
(Urdinez 2014:70-73). This exposed the vul-
nerable sectors of the Argentinean economy 
and demonstrated the capabilities of the Chi-
nese officials who, by including financial 
and commercial matters into the bargain, can 
influence a country’s diplomacy and ideolo-
gy. 
In addition, since 2005, Chinese injections of 
capital started to be introduced into Argenti-
na’s economy through direct investment and 
lending. The same year, China purchased 
Argentinean debt bonds, which were mainly 
issued with the purpose of meeting its finan-
cial obligations with the IMF. So, because 
of this, further Chinese investment was used 
for improving the public infrastructure such 
as highways and railways. In return, Argen-
tina agreed to take a common stance against 
US and European agriculture subsidies in 
the WTO (Urdinez 2014). 
Since 2006, there has been a series of bila-
teral agreements signed by both parties with 
the aim of boosting cooperation in areas that 
include natural gas, tobacco and pharmaceu-
tical commercialization, as well as tourism, 
educational services, and biotechnology 
transfers, and the consolidation of the Chi-
na-MERCOSUR agreement. Furthermore, 
in 2009, a fund of US$ 11 billion in Pesos and 
Renminbi was created between the Argenti-
nean Central Bank and the People’s Bank of 
China to set commercial transactions in both 
national currencies. Hence, both countries 
have cooperated in taking small steps to set 
aside dependency on the US dollar for inter-
national transactions (Oliva 2010:104-105).
By the analyses of the present Sino-Argenti-
nean relations, it is possible to observe that 
the interrelations of both countries go be-
yond the economic and commercial matters. 
Nowadays, it is clear to observe a demar-
cated scheme of cooperation between these 
nations that include diplomatic, political and 
ideological bonds. China was a crucial pla-
yer in the Argentinean recovery and nowa-
days plays a fundamental role as commercial 
partner and investor for the maintenance of 
its policies. On the other hand, Argentina has 
become largely dependent on China, which 
has demonstrated the power to influence Ar-
gentinean executive decisions.
Bolivia, Morales and China 
After 20 years of neoliberal guidelines, the 
Bolivian state was immersed into a profound 
economic and social crisis. The Washington 
Consensus policies brought to this country, 
an increment in poverty rates while wealth 
was accumulated by a few sectors and taken 
outside the country. Furthermore, the gap 
between rich and poor widened, the infor-
mal economy numbers skyrocketed, and the 
high levels of unemployment caused people 
to work for less than US $ 1 per day (Rowan 
2003:2-3). 
Such precarious conditions resulted into a 
natural response in which Bolivian taxpa-
yers redirected their frustration to oppose 
any neoliberal policy. For Do Alto (2008) 
and Panizza (2009), the failure of the Was-
hington Consensus guidelines triggered the 
popularity of the left anti-elitist leader, Evo 
Morales, which appeared with a demagogi-
cally-social discourse that not only attacked 
aggressively the neoliberalist line of thou-
ght, but also induced a feeling of nationalism 
within the Bolivian collective mind. Since 
Bolivian policies took a shift against neoli-
beralism (Rowan 2003:2). 
A brief valuation of social and economic in-
dicators of Morales` administration shown 
that the GDP has been constantly growing 
around 4.1% and 6.1% each year. In addi-
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tion, the minimum wage escalated from US$ 
57 in 2003 to US$ 238 in 2015, furthermore, 
the infant mortality rate was reduced by 60% 
and most importantly, 3 million people have 
been lifted out of poverty and 1.7 million 
from extreme poverty (Cepal 2015).  Al-
though the Bolivian economy is still fragile 
and dependant, the left policies of the multi-
cultural state have demonstrated remarkably 
better outcomes than the results produced 
by the policies applied during the neoliberal 
period; however, again China, was an impor-
tant player that aimed for such development.
There are two important factors in the 
Evo-Bolivian model. The first one stands for 
the nationalisation of public goods, such as 
water and electricity, as well as the ones con-
cerned with extraction of hydrocarbons and 
mining, which are constitutional recognized 
as strategic resources. Do Alto (2008:177-
183) studied the effects of the nationaliza-
tion of companies in Bolivia, so he remar-
ked that in addition to the new Constitution, 
there are two key legal reforms that helped 
the Bolivian government to succeed in the 
nationalization process without using the fi-
gure of expropriation. 
The first was the supreme decree N. 29701 
and the second the Hydrocarbons’ law. The 
first established that 82% of the profit of 
big companies in the extractive industries 
should go to the state and 50% of the profit 
for the minor ones. The second one dictates 
that all the hydrocarbon resources belong to 
the state. As a result, the Bolivian govern-
ment has been able to benefit directly from 
the boom in the commodities market of the 
last decades. The Bolivian government has 
already gained control of 19% of the Boli-
vian GDP, and the national objectives expect 
that they can get control of 30% of its GDP. 
The second factor is related to an increase of 
exports, mainly attributed to the diversifica-
tion of its markets, predominantly towards 
China. 
In the last decades, the Chinese industrial 
production has diversified from its tradi-
tional industries such as toys and textiles 
production to further segments such as ma-
chinery and chemical production. The rapid 
development of China’s productivity base 
has increased its demand of raw materials. 
Since 2001, China has become the greatest 
importer of minerals and metallic commodi-
ties such as tin, zinc, steel, lead and copper. 
Which produced that the global raw mate-
rial supply was insufficient to go together 
with the world’s growing demand for such 
products. Consequently, the prices started to 
rise rapidly and created a boom in the com-
modities market (Poveda 2010:153-154). 
The boom in the new Sino industries caused 
Bolivia to flourish during the last decades. 
The Bolivian economy is limited to the su-
pply of natural resources, and as an exporter 
of only a few commodities, it is highly sen-
sitive to any matters that occur in the glo-
bal markets. Consequently, the multicultural 
state benefited greatly from the commodity 
boom caused by the Chinese demand. 
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Compared to the 90s, in the XXI century, 
Bolivian exports have increased from US$ 
1307 million in 1996, to US$ 4245 million 
in 2006 (INE 2007). Such increment is the 
result of a market diversification, as can be 
seen in the Figure 3. Export growth to Asia 
and China was especially remarkable with 
an increase from 0.32% of Bolivian exports 
share in 1996 to 9.87% in 2006. Thus, Asia 
has become Bolivia’s second most impor-
tant trade partner in the region. On the other 
hand, it is possible to observe that the trade 
share of the US and the EU has plummeted. 
This situation could be a result of Evo Mora-
les’s resolution to refuse to sign a free trade 
agreement with the US as well as the natio-
nalization of European and North-American 
companies.
Chinese investment has also played a key 
role in Bolivian economic expansion. The-
re are two recent projects of cooperation 
between China and Bolivia that prove this. 
The first is an agreement for a joint venture 
between the Chinese company Shengli and 
the Bolivian Ministry of Hydrocarbons, in 
which Shengli will invest almost $2 billion 
in the assessment, extraction and processing 
of petroleum and natural gas in the north of 
the La Paz region. 
And the second is a cooperation project in 
which both governments will invest in the 
elaboration of a geological map of Bolivia. 
For these projects China will invest $60 mi-
llion in the elaboration of 70% of Bolivia’s 
geological map. Consequently, Bolivia will 
be able to vastly improve their hydrocarbon 
and mining industries, while China would 
then have a preference in the extraction bu-
siness (Poveda 2010:160-165).
Populism in the bonanza 
China played an important part in the main-
tenance of the populist practices of some ad-
ministrations. The direct investment, finan-
cial aid, and the increasing commercial flow 
have brought extraordinary revenues for the 
Latin American governments. Such incomes 
have been redirected in some states to popu-
list practices to boost the popularity of the 
leaders. 
For example, in 2007, Costa Rica followed 
the road of the Dominican Republic that in 
2004 cut relations with Taiwan, due to an en-
couraging offer from The People’s Republic 
of China that could boost their popularity 
among the public. China offered that, in ex-
change of the recognition of the ‘One-China 
policy’ Costa Rica and the Dominican Repu-
blic will receive US$ 100 million and US$ 
122 million respectively for the construction 
of national stadiums. Both countries found 
that this offer was more beneficial than Tai-
wan’s offer, that included US$70 million in 
aid for Costa Rica and 6.8 US$ million in 
assistance for the Dominican Republic (Wu 
& De Wei 2014:789).
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A further case of social polices includes 
countries as Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela 
which have been able to expand the public 
sector, and to reduce unemployment rates by 
using Chinese foreign investment to create 
unproductive public entities to provide jobs. 
For example, when Hugo Chavez got elec-
ted, Venezuela had 16 ministries. By 2013, 
the number of ministries doubled to 32 and 
employed 19.6% of the Venezuelan labour 
force; while in Colombia, which maintained 
a pro-market system, there were 16 minis-
tries which employed 3.5% of the Colom-
bian labour force (Torres 2015). 
Venezuela has received US$ 42.5 billion in 
loans from the Chinese Development Bank 
for improving public infrastructure. None-
theless, in lending terms, the infrastructure 
includes the construction, renovation and 
expansion of public buildings which were 
used to house new public entities with the 
aim of producing artificial jobs (Wu & De 
Wei 2014:92). 
The expansion of the Venezuelan public sec-
tor which meant an extensive increase in the 
public spending has only been possible as it 
was financed by the extraordinary revenues 
that Venezuela has received during the last 
decades as product of the high prices of oil 
during this period. Venezuela’s oil revenues, 
according to the Opec (2015), accounts for 
about 95% of export earnings and the oil and 
gas sector represents around 25 % of the Ve-
nezuelan GDP. 
In 2014, when the commodity boom ended, 
and the prices of fossil fuels dropped, Vene-
zuela’s president, Nicolas Maduro, imple-
mented an emergency readjustment program 
to cut public spending, reducing its number 
of ministries to 28. The Venezuelan oil barre-
ls went from a price of around US$ 100 per 
barrel, to US$ 55 per barrel in 2015, causing 
an economic recession and a deficit in the 
balance of payments and resulting in uncon-
trollable inflation of 52.7%, and an expan-
sion in the numbers of Venezuelans who live 
in poverty and extreme poverty conditions 
(32.5% and 9.8% correspondingly). Conse-
quently, Nicolas Maduro travelled last April 
to China to renegotiate its existing debt by 
adding a US$ 5 billion loan to save its eco-
nomy (Ellsworth 2015). 
The Case of Ecuador: from the Neoliberal 
Financial Crisis to Revolution of Correa
Sobered by the debt crisis from the 80s, 
Ecuador started a series of restructuring pro-
grams during the 90s, in accordance with 
international financial institutions to imple-
ment the neoliberal guidelines of the Was-
hington Consensus. Nazmi (2001:727) has 
claimed that the reckless implementation of 
such reforms caused dangerous macroecono-
mic imbalances to the Ecuadorian economy, 
leading to a profound crisis which resulted 
in the loss of its national currency. 
There are 3 fundamental policies which led 
the Ecuadorian state to its economic collap-
se. First, a reckless scheme of privatization 
that did not match the national reality of the 
state. Second, the artificial imposition of a 
pegged exchange rate that produced a lack 
of liquidity and speculation resulting from 
dangerous liberal prescriptions. And third, 
the lack of autonomy of the state administra-
tion to produce regulatory policies to prohi-
bit irresponsible practices from a weakened 
and corrupt private banking sector.
In 1992 the American-born Sixto Duran 
Ballen was elected as the 37th president of 
Ecuador. Duran Ballen, who was conside-
red a pro-neoliberal republican, implemen-
ted an innovation model in Ecuador. Such 
a model included provisions to reduce the 
Ecuadorian public deficit through austerity 
measures and a privatization scheme of the 
national companies. In 1993, the Ecuadorian 
congress approved the plan through two le-
gislations. First, the Budgetary Law of the 
Public Sector, and second, the ‘Privatization 
and Modernization Law’. 
Both regulations were aimed to downsize 
the government spending, privatize public 
companies and enhance international com-
petition. The first regulation delivered rapid 
results. The state reduced its public-sector 
expenditure from 31.4% of total GDP in 
1987 to 24% in 1994, producing a surplus 
of 0.6% of the GDP in the Ecuadorian balan-
ce of payments at the end of that year. Such 
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an outstanding short-term result generated a 
compensation coming from the IMF, which 
reduced the interest rates for the Ecuadorean 
loans by up to 5% (Nazmi 2001:728-729). 
In 1995, because of the budget cuts that cau-
sed a reduction of labour places in the pu-
blic sector, the unemployment rates started 
to increase rapidly. Furthermore, the privati-
zation scheme was still lacking results. The 
Ecuadorian state had achieved privatization 
of only 11 enterprises while Argentina and 
Bolivia, which were following the same po-
licy guidelines, had accomplished privatisa-
tion of 131 and 57 companies respectively 
(Nazmi 2001:730). The Ecuadorian eco-
nomy, therefore, was not able to expand as 
was expected. Furthermore, the private sec-
tor lacked the efficiency to produce enough 
employment to compensate for jobs lost in 
the public sector during the adjustment pe-
riod. 
To attract foreign investment, the Ecuado-
rian government followed neoliberal pres-
criptions that were applied by the rest of the 
administrations in the region which dictated 
the liberalization of capital movements to 
provide further financial security to foreign 
investors. Owing to this, the Ecuadorian ad-
ministration decided to reform its financial 
legislation. The reforms included the possi-
bility of the creation of US$ Dollar accounts 
in local banks, the establishment of offshore 
accounts, and a pegged exchange rate for the 
national currency. 
For several scholars including Nazmi (2001), 
this was the beginning of what would beco-
me the financial crisis of 1999. After a while, 
the results delivered by the new legislation 
diverged from what the government was ex-
pecting. In the first place the freedom of ca-
pital movements along with the constitutio-
nal reforms repealing the state ownership of 
strategic resources as oil and energy, instead 
of bringing real and long-term investors, at-
tracted short-term capital investments, better 
known as swallow capitals. 
The major part of the oil revenues was trans-
ferred outside of the state, due the absence of 
capital movement regulations (Berriosa Ma-
rakb & Morgensternc 2011:675-681). The 
neoliberal guidelines were clearly providing 
a list of benefits to the private entities, whi-
le the rates of poverty and unemployment 
were critical in the state, demonstrating that 
the foreign investment prescriptions mean 
neither economic growth nor social develo-
pment. 
The collateral effects of the new financial le-
gislation were inevitable. Since it permitted 
the banking sector to generate offshore and 
US$ Dollar accounts, the Ecuadorian finan-
cial institutions of that time restructured their 
balance sheets to reposition their portfolios 
away from Sucres and into US$ Dollars. In 
this process, the banks, which were poor-
ly regulated, expanded their balance sheets 
recklessly. Imprudent practices included a 
relaxed credit risk analysis and resulted in 
a credit rise of 48% per year during 1994 to 
1996. 
Such unhedged exposure to dollar liabili-
ties conditioned the Ecuadorian monetary 
policy, which prevented the Central Bank 
from devaluating its currency. Such a situa-
tion not only undermined the Ecuadorian 
exporting sectors, but also created a moral 
hazard for the banks, which continued with 
their careless operations, which triggered a 
rapid expansion in the Ecuadorian internal 
debt figures, as well as a massive increase 
in its percentage of debt in foreign curren-
cies which by 1998 were about US$ 987.03 
million, from which 91% was in foreign cu-
rrencies (Banco Central del Ecuador 2003).
 Nazmi (2001:733-734) argued that such ar-
tificially pegged exchange rate turned all the 
previous economic difficulties into a full-fle-
dged financial crisis which was made worse 
by external factors such as a belic conflict 
with Peru as well as a series of governamen-
tal corruption scandals. These caused the fai-
lure of the programs that aimed to stabilize 
the Sucre exchange rate. 
As a consequence, the Central Bank was for-
ced to increase the real interest rates from 
1.9% in 1992 to 36.2% in 1999 to encourage 
investors to keep their holdings in Sucres. 
Because of such desperate policies in con-
junction with public speculation, investors 
started to send their money overseas causing 
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a lack of liquidity in the financial sector and 
resulting in the insolvency of seven banks 
including Filanbanco. 
The government monetized their bank losses 
causing the collapse of the exchange rate an-
chor. In 1999, the Sucre depreciated around 
200% and inflation was about 90%. Facing 
social disintegration and economic catas-
trophe, the government took the decision to 
freeze all bank accounts for one year and in 
2000 announced the intention to dollarize 
the economy (Nazmi 2001:733-734). 
During a ten-year period (1996-2006), Ecua-
dorians observed seven different leaders oc-
cupying the position of president. However, 
none of the leaders can provide any type of 
improvement to the Ecuadorian economy or 
to the standards of living of their citizens. 
Nonetheless, in 2007, Ecuadorians elected 
Rafael Correa as their head of state. Correa 
was a populist university lecturer, with an 
academic background in economics who 
did not have links to the traditional politi-
cal parties. This fact caused his popularity to 
spread rapidly among the electorate, which 
was tired of the traditional representatives 
(Jaramillo-Jassir 2012:151-152). In 2007, 
once elected, the new administration started 
its revolutionary process which substituted 
the neoliberal regime policies established 
in Ecuador since the 80s with policies fo-
llowing a model of endogenous growth pri-
marily favouring the working class. 
To legitimate their actions in the political 
and in the legal field, a referendum, mainly 
intended to produce a new constitution that 
included all these reforms, was proposed. 
The result was approved by an overwhel-
ming majority of 80% of the electorate. 
Furthermore, the new constitution project 
which proposed a more egalitarian system, 
was accepted the following year by 65% of 
the electorate (Becker 2011:49-51). 
Following the constitutional prescriptions 
based on the Sumac Kawsay, an ancient 
indigenous belief that proposes an austere, 
socialist and ‘good’ way of living, the Ecua-
dorian administration repatriated and mo-
bilized the international monetary reserves 
which were previously deposited in foreign 
banks, towards public financial entities and 
national banks. The use of national savings 
has been condemned as fiscally irresponsi-
ble, but the new constitution established that 
fiscal policy cannot be divergent from gene-
rating incentives for productive investment. 
Between 2007 and 2011, public investment 
as a percentage of GDP grew at an average 
rate of 11.7%. Correspondingly, social in-
vestment reached 26% of public spending in 
2011 (Banco Central del Ecuador 2014). It 
has, therefore, been possible for the admi-
nistration to provide absolute coverage for 
enrolment in primary, middle schools and 
high schools and to eliminate costs for medi-
cal consultation.  In addition, the left-winged 
agenda proposed a network of social inclu-
sion, the continuation of subsidies in basic 
services, and as well a series of programs to 
enhance the reduction of poverty and wage 
inequality (Ramírez Gallegos 2011:11-12). 
Ecuador was not receiving the maximum 
utility from such industry; a situation attri-
butable to the fact that 53.7% of oil produc-
tion of that time belonged to private compa-
nies. Furthermore, as was mentioned before, 
the type of contract that the state maintained 
with the corporations was not profitable at 
all due to the major income was coming 
from renting the land rather than from pro-
duction. This is the reason why, in 2010, the 
project of nationalization and renegotiation 
of contracts started, following the constitu-
tional guidelines which dictate that strategic 
resources belong to Ecuadorians. 
By 2012, the private production of oil was 
reduced to 25.6%., the activities of compa-
nies like Texaco-Chevron and OXY were 
passed to the national oil company of Ecua-
dor, Petro Ecuador. This re-nationalization 
of strategic resources allowed the Ecua-
dorian state to maximize benefits from the 
commodity boom of the last decade (Berrio-
sa Marakb & Morgensternc 2011:675-681). 
These series of reforms and the repossession 
of strategic resources has provided Correa’s 
administration with a considerable increase 
in public revenues. As a matter of fact, Ecua-
dorian exportation revenue soared from US$ 
14,556.2 million in 2007 to US$ 26,067.1 
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million in 2014 of which the oil revenue 
share represents 47% of total exportations 
and 66% of the raw materials exportations. 
Hence the nationalization scheme has been 
a crucial factor for the maintenance of the 
social policies that Correa’s administration 
has implemented.
On the other hand, the new constitution of 
Ecuador prohibited any type of outsourcing 
and hourly-paid activities. Forcing priva-
te companies to provide full-time contracts 
with fully remunerated salaries as well as 
social healthcare and a 15% share of profits 
to workers. By 2006, 800,000 workers were 
part of outsourcing companies. This repre-
sented 17% of the labour force. Thus, thou-
sands of workers were introduced into the 
formal sector, which grew from 38% from 
2009 to 45% in 2010 (Banco Central del 
Ecuador 2014). 
The working class, as was expected, de-
monstrated satisfaction with these measu-
res. However, the private sector experienced 
considerable downsizing. It was alleged that 
it was unmanageable to maintain the same 
number of workers with this new package of 
benefits. This was reflected in the unemplo-
yment figures that grew from 7.9% in 2009 
to 9.1% in 2010 (Banco Central del Ecuador 
2014), (Uquillas 2007:37). To fight against 
the rise of unemployment, the government 
generated jobs by creating new state enti-
ties. Since 2007, six national ministries in 
addition to a considerable number of regio-
nal secretaries and regulatory entities, were 
created. 
This generated 110,000 new jobs between 
2008 and 2014. Furthermore, in the last se-
ven years, the minimum wage has grown 
100%, from US$ 170 in 2007 to US$ 340 
in 2014. In the following graphs, it is pos-
sible to notice that not only has the unem-
ployment rate fallen, employment in formal 
sectors has grown too. This could show that 
more workers are nowadays able to receive 
better work conditions, fully-paid salaries 
and social benefits. However, most employ-
ment generated in Ecuador has been the pro-
duct of the creation of public sector entities. 
In 2013, 20.68% of all formal employment 
were bureaucrats who do not necessary ge-
nerate revenue for the state. In fact, it repre-
sents an enormous fiscal cost for the state to 
maintain such jobs.
The key role of China on the Ecuadorian 
Buen Vivir
The Buen Vivir could be perceived as a so-
cialist model, which pursues to improve the 
standards of living of the Ecuadorians by re-
ducing poverty and redistributing the wealth 
by creating pro-environmental and sustai-
nable policies (SENPLADES 2009). The 
results of the Buen Vivir model, until 2014, 
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had been remarkable. 
Based on socioeconomic macro indicators, 
Ecuador not only expanded its economy by 
maintaining a consistent GDP annual grow-
th, which grew from 3.5% to 7.9%, but has 
also lifted 10% of its total population from 
poverty and, as was mentioned before, redu-
ced its unemployment rates. 
Furthermore, the socialist policies have im-
proved the rate of secondary school enrol-
ment up to 87% in 2013 from 46% in 2007 
and reduced infant mortality rate. Ecuador 
also has seen an expansion of its industrial 
sectors and in general terms, living con-
ditions of the Ecuadorians have been im-
proved (Cepal 2015). This brief overview 
demonstrates how socialist policies have in-
deed demonstrated real development in the 
Ecuadorian state. Nevertheless, the efficacy 
of such endogenous plan development, as it 
has been described in the Ecuadorian natio-
nal policy plan, has gone along with a series 
of exogenous factors, including the general 
expansion in the global commodity markets 
and alternatives for financial assistance that 
China has provided to the Ecuadorian gover-
nment. 
Until 2013, Ecuador had signed 4 agree-
ments with the Chinese government. The 
contracts prescribed and anticipated the sale 
of a fixed number of oil barrels, so that the 
Ecuadorian government could receive fi-
nancial assistance from the China Develop-
ment Bank at floating interest of around 7%. 
Consequently, the Ecuadorian foreign debt 
rose from US$ 7392 million in 2009 to US$ 
16913 million in 2014, from which 37.6% 
is owed to China, (Banco Central del Ecua-
dor 2014). Furthermore, at the beginning of 
2015, the Ecuadorian economy was shrin-
king because of the fall of oil prices. This 
situation encouraged Rafael Correa to visit 
China to negotiate further lines of credit 
with Chinese officials. 
After Correa attended the ministerial mee-
ting of the Forum of China and the Com-
munity of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC), Correa reunited on various 
occasions with his counterpart Xi Jinping, 
resulting in the signing of a series of con-
tracts which included new  lines of Chinese 
credits that reached US$ 7500 million, from 
which 26.6% has been designated merely to 
compensate fiscal imbalances produced by 
the downfall of the oil prices, while the rest 
will be used to finance the construction of 
what will be the biggest refinery in Ecuador.
Villavicencio (2013), who has analysed the 
nature of Chinese oil contracts, exposed the 
downsides of the Chinese cooperation sche-
me. He demonstrated that although the ori-
ginal aim of the Asian power was to secure 
energy supplies to meet burgeoning demand, 
nowadays, Chinese companies can freely 
trade a significant amount of Ecuador’s cru-
de oil exports. In 2013 only 46.5% of Chine-
se-controlled Ecuadorian oil exports went to 
China, with the balance resold to other coun-
tries, primarily the United States. 
He concluded in 2013 that Ecuador will be a 
victim of a debt trap again compromising the 
sovereignty policies of the country. By 2015, 
such predictions seemed to have been ma-
king sense. With the continuing decline of 
oil prices, Ecuadorian officials have found 
themselves in a tricky position. If they want 
to perpetuate the ‘Good Living’ model, they 
35
REVISTA CHAKIÑAN, 2018, Nº.5, AGOSTO, (18-39)
ISSN 2550-6722
have to increase the taxation base, apply 
austerity measures or acquire more debt. All 
alternatives are expected to generate critical 
outcomes. 
The rise in taxes and the measures taken du-
ring 2015 have generated a series of protests 
and rioting in the main cities of Ecuador. 
Such a situation not only has destabilized 
the political order, but also slowed produc-
tivity. Furthermore, the low prices of oil, 
which translates in a reduction of revenue 
for the state, will affect its ability to make 
repayment of debts, generating a situation in 
which a share of the future loans that Ecua-
dor acquire will have to be used for the re-
payment of interest and fiscal imbalances, as 
has happened in the first period of 2015. 
Hence the contraction of the prices of com-
modities in the global markets has expo-
sed the pitfalls of socialist models in Latin 
America, which have evidently demonstra-
ted to be maintainable only due to a market 
boom, rather than to real expansion within 
the productivity sectors. Furthermore, rec-
kless social expenditure has been upheld by 
carelessly expanding foreign debt and com-
promising the allocation of strategic resour-
ces for various years, currently around 80% 
of Ecuador’s exported oil is handled by Chi-
nese firms, limiting the state ability to secure 
the best market price for its crude (Villavi-
cencio 2013 ).
The Yasuni case is a clear demonstration of 
Chinese power. It demonstrates that they 
have great influence on Ecuadorian poli-
cy-making, especially in energy and com-
mercial matters. China has leveraged its in-
fluential power not only by generating large 
sums of debt, but also by controlling the fu-
ture oil production of Ecuador. Chinese oil 
companies have displaced Western compa-
nies from Ecuadorian territory and have gai-
ned enough resources to influence govern-
mental decisions in favour of their interests. 
On the other hand, Ecuadorian officials have 
entered a situation of dependency in which 
the sovereignty of its policies is reliant upon 
ensuring the interests of a hegemonic power 
are fulfilled.   
The Ecuadorian constitution prohibits any 
type of extraction of natural resources in 
protected areas. However, from 2016 over 
846 million barrels of oil will be drilled 
from the ITT block (Ishpingo, Tambococha 
and Tiputini), located in the Yasuní National 
Park. The Yasuni, which is in the Ecuado-
rian Amazon region, was designated by the 
UNESCO as biosphere reserve in 1989 and 
is claimed to hold more than 100 000 of di-
fferent species of flora and fauna, besides 
being the home of two uncontacted indige-
nous tribes. 
The Yasuni contains around 20% of Ecua-
dor’s fossil fuel reserves, which is the rea-
son why many energy companies have been 
operating in the peripheral areas of the natio-
nal park since the 1970s. However, the core 
areas, including the ITT blocks, have never 
been touched. Nonetheless, due to external 
pressures and fiscal deficits, this situation 
has changed. In 2014, the Ecuadorian Natio-
nal Assembly, declared the area as a “natio-
nal interest”, taking away its condition as a 
protected area and therefore allowing extrac-
tion of natural resources in such areas. 
On February of 2015, it was revealed that the 
Ecuadorian government had for some years 
been negotiating a further 1-billion-dollar 
loan with China, giving Chinese oil compa-
nies the right to explore and exploit the Ya-
suni-ITT oil reserves. Nowadays, Block 14, 
part of the ITT, is operated by Petro Oriental, 
which is owned by the China National Petro-
leum Corporation (CNPC) and which owns 
55%, and Sinopec, which owns the other 
45% (Ortiz 2015). 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has outlined the way in which 
China has established a demarcated global 
scheme of cooperation that has proven to 
be attractive to many non-western states. 
During the last decades, the development of 
China has been remarkable and its influen-
ce over developing regions has shown that 
it is not merely a commercial and economic 
power. The massive accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves, the vast quantity of finan-
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cial assistance provided, the increasing share 
of participation in natural resource markets 
as well as an extensive agenda of bilateral 
cooperation are factors that demonstrate the 
capabilities of China’s vast global influence.
The Chinese economic expansion has brou-
ght to developing economies a series of 
opportunities and pitfalls. China’s appetite 
for commodities has opened a great door for 
commercial sectors of the developing eco-
nomies around the globe. Furthermore, the 
lending programs of the Chinese Develop-
ment Bank have demonstrated to be a remar-
kable alternative for the IMF or the World 
Bank, without regarding the political model 
or the ideological line of thought, China has 
become since 2001, a sine qua non-for the 
contemporary construction of commercial 
and foreign policies of the developing and 
developed states around the globe.
For Latin American states, which have not 
been capable to accomplishing a real deve-
lopment under the regulations of a Western 
economic agenda for 30 years, the Chinese 
cooperation scheme, which includes finan-
cial assistance and commercialization of 
strategic resources has provided them with 
the opportunity to generate more autono-
mous and socialist policies, which have de-
monstrated better outcomes than under the 
neoliberal guidelines.  However, as was de-
monstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, the sustaina-
bility and success of these models are clearly 
reliant on Chinese loans and high prices in 
commodity markets. 
By 2015, the pitfalls of the Chinese coope-
ration system and problems with the Latin 
American socialist models have become evi-
dent. The expansion of the economy in Latin 
American states has been a direct result of 
a boom in the commodity market. Such ex-
traordinary incomes have allowed the states 
to recklessly expand their fiscal expenditure 
and to artificially develop their economies 
and generate several social policies that have 
produced political stability. However, since 
2014, the global price of commodities has 
fallen causing profound deficits in the balan-
ce of payments of the states which maintain 
such socialist models. Therefore, they have 
acquired large sums of debt, especially with 
China, to compensate such imbalances. This 
situation has demonstrated the unsustainabi-
lity of such models and the large dependency 
that they had on endogenous factors. 
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